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This study analyses the income distribution within couples in the Czech Republic 
and ten European countries using the EU-SILC 2005 database. Data from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database supplement the analysis with previous 
period (1986–2000). Women, on average, contribute less to a couple’s income than 
men. Among the included countries, within-couple income inequality tends to be 
lower in the new EU member states than in the old ones, with the Czech Republic 
being the exception. Within-couple income inequality has two crucial factors: 
employment of female partners and, subsequently, their wages. In the context of the 
first, the inter-generational transmission of the traditional model of the family 
proved to have a significant negative impact on the female employment decision 
mainly in the old EU member states. Finally, gender wage gaps between men and 
women who live in a couple were examined and compared with the gender wage 
gaps for single individuals. The gender wage gap proved to be higher for cohabiting 
individuals than for singles even after adjusting for gender differences in individual 
and job characteristics. 
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1. Introduction 
Most studies dealing with income inequality consider the individual and/or household as the 
basic unit of research. However, the analysis of income inequalities from an 
individual/household point of view does not fully describe the individual’s position in income 
distribution. The fact is that society is highly structured in terms of internal household 
organization, too. It follows that both approaches mentioned above ignore income 
re/distribution within the household, and this can distort the picture of the relationship 
between people’s financial and social well-being. 
The within-household income distribution can be of great importance, especially in transition 
countries. The transition from communist-style compulsory employment (i.e. almost full 
employment of both men and women) to a diversified labour market with increasing gender 
income inequality may considerably change within-household bargaining. Since this field has 
not been examined sufficiently in the Czech Republic, we know little about within-household 
gender issues in the process of transition. Therefore, I will try to fill this empirical gap by 
producing a detailed description of wage differentials in couples (both with and without 
children) and comparing the results with selected transition and West European countries. 
The results obtained should deliver new insights into problems that are highly relevant, not 
only to post-communist societies, but also to highly developed countries. For instance, 
partnership (family) relations are changing, especially in developed countries. More 
specifically, there is a mismatch between the changing within-family earnings distribution in 
favour of women and the traditional division of roles within the family.
1 This may be eroding 
the traditional family model, which has consequences for demographic development. In this 
regard, the economics of households can deliver some answers that are of potential social and 
economic relevance.  
In terms of the policy relevance of the present research, economic and social policies need 
adequate instruments to catch the dynamics of the ongoing changes in income distribution and 
their impacts on social stability. The present research intends to contribute to this. Great 
importance will be attached especially to a comparison between the transition, the new EU 
member countries, and the old EU member states. Current within-couple income inequalities 
might differ between these two groups of countries and the first group’s recent experience of 
communism could be of great importance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a literature overview 
and discusses the empirical proofs of rejection of the assumption of household income 
pooling. It also outlines in more detail the aims of this study. Section 3 describes the data 
sources to which the present analyses are to be applied. Section 4 focuses on within-couple 
income inequality in several steps. First, it discusses the female share of couple income and 
the biggest contributing factors determining that share across the covered countries. In the 
second step, it focuses on the employment decision of women living in a couple as the most 
apparent source of within-couple income inequality. In this context, the main emphasis is put 
on the inter-generational transmission of the traditional family model. The last part of Section 
4 describes gender income inequality within two-earner couples.  
Section 5 analyses the wage differentials between women and men living in a couple in 
general and compares the gender wage gaps for cohabiting and single individuals separately. 
                                                            
1 This topic was discussed, for example, by Rost (2002). 2 
 
The main findings, including comparisons between the old and the new EU member states, 
are summarized in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature overview and new objectives 
Many studies have been carried out that examine the distributional changes at the household 
level, most of them in order to analyse the impact of social and tax policy changes (see, e.g., 
Giles and Johnson, 1994, Redmond and Sutherland, 1995). Another type of studies has 
examined whether increasing income inequality across families can be ascribed to a stronger 
connection between spouses’ earnings (e.g. Schwartz, 2010). 
The household can be an appropriate unit if we assume that the individuals who live in the 
same dwelling share their income and decisions about expenditures. This would conform to 
the assumptions of the unitary model of household behaviour and income pooling in 
households. 
Bonke and Uldal-Poulsen (2005) stated that about two-thirds of Danish households pool their 
income. Among all the factors suggested by theory that influence the likelihood of income 
pooling in the household, they found the duration of marriage and the existence of children to 
be the only ones with a clear impact. 
However, many recent studies have appeared that reject the assumption of income pooling 
since income distribution within the household influences, for instance, decision-making, 
expenditures on consumption, and/or the satisfaction of individual household members (see, 
e.g., Ermish and Pronzato, 2006; Thomas, 1990; Heimdal and Houseknecht, 2003; Browning 
et al., 1994; Lundberg et al., 1996; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Tiefenthaler, 1999).  
Using the Danish expenditure survey, Bonke and Browning (2006) argue that the wife’s share 
of consumption expenditures is higher the higher her share of gross income is. The same 
authors (2003) proved that women and men living in a couple often report a different level of 
satisfaction with their financial situation; the wife’s share of household income increases her 
satisfaction while it decreases his. Bonke (2006) shows that the share of women’s income out 
of the total personal income in the household is 20% in most Southern European countries, 
with Portugal being the most extreme. The opposite extreme is in Denmark, where women’s 
income accounts for around 40% of total household income. 
Unfortunately, this study does not provide any evidence for the rejection of the unitary 
household model. Data surveys in the Czech Republic, which is the subject of this analysis, 
contain no information on consumption expenditures on the individual level and no subjective 
variables such as satisfaction with one’s financial situation, both of which are commonly used 
in studies of the income pooling hypothesis. 
Therefore, based on the existing empirical evidence, we only can assume that the within-
household income distribution to a certain extent influences the position of women in terms of 
bargaining power, consumption decisions, and welfare. Unequal access to financial resources 
within couples could have a significant impact on the living standard and well-being of both 
partners. Instead of trying to accept/reject the income pooling hypothesis, this study will 
analyse income inequality within couples in several steps and compare the findings among 
European countries. 
Figari et al. (2007) explored the effects of tax and benefit systems on differences in income 
and in incentives to earn income among men and women within couples in 9 old EU member 3 
 
states. They found that women contributed least to pre-tax and benefit income in Greece and 
most in Finland. The tax-benefit systems equivalised couple incomes the most in Austria and 
Finland.  
Unlike the majority of the above-mentioned studies, the analysis in this paper includes both 
old and new EU member states and stresses the differences between them. This will provide a 
valuable basic insight into the potentially unequal financial and social well-being of partners 
and the impact that the new EU member states’ previous experience of a communist regime 
might have on this. 
It is obvious that the main factor contributing to within-couple income inequality is the 
economic activity of both partners. Given that, generally, women contribute less to the 
household income than men do and female labour market participation is typically lower, I 
consider the economic activity of female partners to be crucial. I aim to quantify the factors 
that influence the employment decision of cohabiting women since this is the factor that 
explains the greatest part of within-couple income inequalities. Using logistic regression I will 
examine the individual and household characteristics that contribute to the employment of 
female partners. In addition to the usual variables that influence the a woman’s decision to 
work, such as education, age, the number and age of children in the household, and unearned 
income, I intend to apply variables that could depict the relationship between the 
characteristics of a couple and decision-making. 
In this context, of main interest is the traditional division of female and male roles and the 
extent to which this still influences decision-making within couples in society today. Couples 
in which the male and/or female partner grew up in a ‘traditional family model’, that is, in a 
family where the father was the breadwinner and the mother was a housewife, could be 
influenced by this tradition. The inter-generational transmission of the traditional division of 
roles could have an effect on whether women in such couples work or not. In the next step, 
the analysis focuses on two-earner couples and outlines the characteristics that contribute 
most to within-couple income inequality.  
Finally, to stress the income disparities between individuals living in a couple and singles in 
general, I compare the gender wage gap and its structure separately for individuals living in a 
couple and singles.  
 
3. Survey data 
The main part of this analysis is based on data from the EU–Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) household survey. This survey is uniform and compulsory for all EU 
Member States, so it provides data suitable for cross-country comparisons. Information is 
collected on households (mainly information on living conditions, joint income, and joint 
social allowances) and individuals (individual and job characteristics, wages, income, and 
social allowances).  
This study draws on the first wave of the survey (EU-SILC 2005), because that wave included 
an ad hoc module on the inter-generational transmission of poverty in the given year. These 
additional data provide us with information on the family circumstances in which the 
individuals grew up. Respondents answered questions about their parents, such as the parents’ 
prevailing economic activity, occupation, and education when the respondents were teenagers.  4 
 
Only countries that provided information on both gross and net income data and contained the 
full battery of the module variables were included in this analysis. Besides the Czech 
Republic, ten other European countries were involved: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Estonia, 
France, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, and Slovakia.
2 For the sake of brevity, I 
call the six new EU member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
and Slovakia) ‘NMS’, while the other five included countries, the old EU member states 
(Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and Luxembourg), are called ‘OMS’. 
The sample used in the analysis of within-couple income inequality consists of couples living 
in the same household irrespective of the legal status of their partnership. I excluded couples 
in which at least one member is collecting a retirement pension and couples who share their 
household with other adults. Other adults are considered individuals aged 25 and over or 
individuals aged 16 to 24 who earn their own income or live without their parents. I define 
dependent children as those under the age of 16 and those between the ages of 16 and 24 who 
do not have their own earned income, live with parents, and are not in a couple themselves. In 
other words, the sample includes households of two adults living in a partnership in which the 
only other members, if there are any, are their dependent children. This is so the male and 
female shares of income represent the total household income.  
Because the analysis requires working age couples and the ad hoc module on the inter-
generational transmission of poverty was applied only to individuals aged 25 and over, I set 
an age limit on the couples so that all the adults are aged 25 to 65. I decided to exclude 
couples in which the male or the female gross or net income was negative and in which the 
couple’s total gross or net income was non-positive since in these cases I cannot determine the 
share of women’s income ranging from 0 to 1.  
The characteristics of the countries in the sample are presented in Table A.1. Couples in 
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia are more likely to be legally married, to have children and to 
be younger than in the other countries studied. Couples in which women are the sole earners 
are more common in Lithuania and Poland than elsewhere. 
Two-earner couples are the most common in Slovakia, Estonia, and France. France and 
Estonia have the lowest marriage rates. Estonia also has the largest share of couples in which 
the woman has a higher level of education than the man (35%), while the share of such 
couples is extremely small in the Czech and Slovak Republics (10%). In the Czech Republic 
and in Slovakia, educational homogamy appears to be much higher than in the other countries 
studied – 75% and 77% of couples, respectively, have the same level of education. 
Childless couples are more common in Germany, Belgium, and Austria. Austria, Germany 
and Luxembourg have the largest shares of couples in which the man has a higher level of 
education than the woman (30%, 29%, and 25%, respectively). In these countries and in 
Hungary, the man is relatively often the only earner (29%, 29%, 33%, and 29%, respectively).  
As far as the legacy of the traditional family model is concerned, the share of couples in 
which at least one of the partners grew up in a traditional family is smaller in the post-
communist, new EU member states, where employment was compulsory under the previous 
regime. The share of such couples ranges from 66% to 83% in the old EU member states, 
while from only 10% to 26% in the NMS, with the exception of Poland and Hungary, where 
the figure is approximately one-third of all couples. 
                                                            
2 Hungary and Slovakia lack variables for net (after-tax) incomes. However, this analysis focuses mainly on a 
comparison of Central European countries, so Hungary and Slovakia are included. 5 
 
The findings in sub-subsection 4.2, which focuses on two-earner couples, are enriched by data 
from previous years drawn from the database of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).
3 The 
LIS database ex-post harmonizes datasets available for various countries as much as possible 
so that the datasets represent a highly suitable source for international comparisons. However, 
not all the information required for this analysis is provided. Most countries lack information 
on income from self-employment at the individual level and usually provide gross or net 
wages only. Therefore, the findings can be limited to two-employee couples only, applying 
the same restrictions on household structure as mentioned above. 
The data sample used in Section 5 comparing the gender wage gap for cohabitating and single 
individuals employs two sub-samples. In the sub-sample of cohabitating persons (both 
married and not) the restrictions that were applied to the couple sample are relaxed.
4 The 
sample thus consists of a sub-sample of all cohabitating adult persons and a sub-sample of 
adult singles, aged 16 to 65 irrespective of the presence of other household members. The 
methodology applied to examine the gender wage gap required further sample variations 
which are discussed in the methodological part in Section 5. 
 
4. Inequality within couples 
The indicator used to measure within-couple income inequality is the female share of total 
couple income. Table 1 shows the female share of total gross income (earnings from 
employment and self-employment) according to household characteristics and the effects of 
the tax and benefit system.
5 The extent to which taxation (plus social contributions) and social 
benefits bring the female contribution to couple income closer to 50% indicates the rate of the 
equalizing function of the tax and benefit systems. 
The female share of couple gross income is the smallest and thus gross income inequality 
within couples the highest in Luxembourg (25.6%), followed by the other old EU member 
states and by the Czech Republic (32.6%). Within-couple gross income inequality is lower in 
all the new EU member states studied – it is the lowest in Slovakia (41.3%), followed by 
Lithuania (40.9%). 
The tax system equalizes within-couple income inequality the most in Austria (0.7 pp) and 
Belgium (0.6 pp).
6 In Estonia, the tax system increases the female share of couple income in 
more than one-half of the couples.  
                                                            
3 For details, see www.lisproject.org. The data-files of most countries were taken from waves III and IV (only 
wave III for Slovakia since personal data file is not available in wave IV). The analysis was supplemented with 
wave II in Poland and wave V in France. Specific years are stated in Table 3. LIS database does not contain 
Lithuania. Estonia is included only in wave V, however, relevant personal income data are missing.  
4 Couples living with other adults in the household, couples where at least one member collects a retirement 
pension, couples with total non-positive income, and individuals under the age of 25 are no longer excluded. 
5 Annual income is applied. For the Czech Republic, the missing net income from self-employment was imputed. 
I computed the net values according to the tax-system framework valid in 2004, including joint taxation for 
married couples with dependent children. However, the net values of income from self-employment can be 
undervalued since I am not able to apply all tax deductible items due to a lack of data. Disposable income is 
defined as net earnings plus (net) social benefits. These benefits consist of benefits received by individuals and 
benefits received by a household as a whole. Benefits taken into account at the individual level include 
unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, disability benefits, and education-related allowances. The joint 
household benefits consist of family- and child-related allowances, housing allowances and benefits related to 
social exclusion not elsewhere classified – these benefits were split in half between the couple. 
6 Hungary and Slovakia are not considered since there are no data on net incomes. 6 
 
Table 1 Female share of couple income (%) 
  AT BE CZ DE EE FR HU LT LU PL SK 
Gross  earnings  28.5 34.6 32.6 30.0 36.8 34.6 37.1 40.9 25.6 36.6 41.3 
(total  sample)  (25.6) (24.4) (25.0) (29.3) (26.3) (24.7) (29.5) (30.6) (25.4) (32.9) (27.5) 
Couples in which women have greater gross earnings (% of whole couple sample) 
  15.2 21.9 18.4 21.5 24.8 23.7 30.1 34.0 14.1 31.3 26.9 
Bottom  quintile 24.6 28.4 27.8 32.3 40.3 25.8 30.2 40.0 23.1 32.4 48.8 
  (36.1) (36.6) (38.6) (39.8) (40.8) (34.3) (40.1) (44.7) (32.8) (43.5) (43.9) 
Top  quintile  32.6 36.4 35.4 37.2 35.3 36.1 38.1 40.4 30.9 41.4 38.7 
  (18.7) (17.1) (17.1) (19.2) (20.2) (21.2) (22.8) (22.5) (20.5) (22.8) (17.8) 
Both  worked  36.2 39.8 38.1 36.6 40.7 40.3 44.9 41.9 35.1 42.9 44.4 
  (17.5) (14.2) (17.3) (21.5) (19.1) (18.2) (18.1) (22.5) (17.5) (24.2) (20.9) 
At least one 
grew up in t. f. 
27.9  34.4  32.7 27.6* 35.0 33.8* 39.1 46.1* 25.4  37.1  41.3 
(26.1) (25.0) (26.1) (28.6) (24.6) (24.9) (31.2) (32.2) (25.7) (34.3) (29.7) 
Neither grew up 
in a t. f.  
30.4 35.5 32.5 34.5 37.0 36.6 36.1 39.7 26.9 36.3 41.3 
(23.8) (21.2) (24.8) (30.2) (26.5) (24.0) (28.6) (30.1) (23.8) (32.3) (26.7) 
Man has higher 
education 
25.3 25.8* 29.9 24.1* 32.2 26.6*  28.6*  33.3* 18.9 26.9*  36.1* 
(26.0) (26.4) (24.1) (27.7) (25.6) (25.1) (27.3) (32.4) (22.4) (32.2) (26.8) 
Same level of 
education 
27.3 34.2 32.8 30.4 35.4 34.4 38.2 39.0 26.2 35.0 41.3 
(24.4) (21.9) (24.8) (28.9) (25.3) (23.9) (29.2) (29.7) (25.6) (32.6) (27.4) 
Woman has 
higher educ.  
37.2* 42.1*  35.0  37.2* 40.9* 40.3* 43.4* 48.0* 32.6* 46.4* 47.6* 
(26.5) (25.6) (27.3) (30.6) (27.6) (24.4) (31.0) (30.0) (26.4) (32.2) (27.9) 
Older partner 
aged under 45 
24.8* 36.5* 28.9* 27.2* 33.3*  34.5 31.9*  39.2* 26.4 35.4*  38.4* 
(22.5) (20.3) (23.7) (27.2) (24.7) (23.8) (26.9) (29.2) (23.0) (31.6) (26.1) 
Older partner 
aged 45+ 
35.2 31.1 38.9 34.6 42.8 34.6 46.4 44.0 24.3 39.2 47.2 
(29.3) (30.3) (26.0) (31.9) (27.8) (26.2) (31.6) (32.9) (28.9) (35.5) (29.3) 
With dependent 
children 
23.7*  34.6  29.2* 23.5* 35.1* 33.4* 34.4* 39.4* 21.9* 35.4* 40.1* 
(23.5) (22.2) (24.6) (26.8) (25.6) (24.1) (28.8) (29.5) (23.6) (32.5) (26.9) 
Without dep. 
children  
38.8 34.7 40.7 41.4 41.9 37.9 45.2 45.9 35.5 41.5 48.1 
(27.0) (28.4) (24.0) (29.9) (27.8) (25.9) (30.1) (33.6) (27.1) (34.5) (30.1) 
Married  couple 27.9*  33.5*  31.7*  27.8* 37.2 32.7* 37.2  41.2 23.4* 36.3  41.2 
  (25.8) (25.0) (24.9) (29.0) (25.9) (24.7) (29.7) (30.4) (24.5) (32.9) (27.5) 
Not  married  33.4 41.9 40.3 44.0 35.9 39.9 36.8 35.8 40.4 40.9 41.9 
    (24.0) (18.6) (24.6) (27.3) (27.6) (23.9) (28.3) (35.0) (26.1) (33.4) (28.1) 
Net  earnings  29.2 35.2 32.7 29.8 37.2 34.8  -  40.8 25.6 36.7  - 
(total  sample)  (25.4) (24.3) (24.8) (29.4) (26.2) (24.8)    (30.1) (25.3) (33.1)   
Couples in which women have greater net earnings (% of whole couple sample) 
  14.6 20.6 18.3 21.3 23.5 24.2  -  33.8 12.9 31.5  - 
Disposable  inc.  31.8 36.5 36.0 30.8 38.8 36.8  -  41.8 28.3 37.2  - 
(total  sample)  (18.6) (18.2) (17.9) (22.4) (21.3) (19.2)    (25.9) (20.2) (28.2)   
Couples in which women have greater disposable income (% of whole couple sample) 
  13.2 19.3 17.5 19.0 23.1 23.3  -  34.0 11.6 30.6  - 
Couples in which tax system increased female share of couple earnings (% of whole couple sample) 
  47.6 45.3 46.2 34.7 54.0 49.8  -  38.0 32.5 33.5  - 
Increase  (pp.)**  2.4 3.2 0.8 3.6 1.3 0.9  -  2.4 2.1 1.7  - 
Couples in which benefit system increased female share of couple income (% of whole couple sample) 
  63.2 57.8 54.0 56.7 57.1 50.5  -  29.2 65.2 31.0  - 
Increase  (pp.)**  7.1 5.5 8.9 6.9 5.2 7.5  -  8.8 6.1 9.4  - 
Couples in which tax-benefit system increased female share of couple income (% of whole couple sample) 
  74.3 62.5 71.9 58.9 69.3 67.9  -  52.8 69.1 52.7  - 
Increase  (pp.)**  7.5 7.0 7.1 7.9 5.1 6.1  -  6.4 6.4 6.4  - 
Notes: Means, standard deviations in parenthesis. Couple gross income quintiles are calculated across couples 
with positive gross income using the modified OECD equivalence scale. *Difference of means significant at 
5% (t-test). For the level of education (measured in years) the mean is compared to the mean when having the 
same level of education. **Average percentage points increase of female share of couple income in couples 
where tax and/or benefit system induced a change.  
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation). 
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The social system increases the female share of income the most in the Czech Republic 
(3.3 pp), Luxembourg (2.7 pp), and Austria (2.6 pp). This is partly caused by the share of 
couple gross income which is one of the lowest in these countries and, hence, the equalizing 
function of social benefits is stronger. The benefit system raises the female share of couple 
income in more than 60% of the couples in Luxembourg and Austria. These are also the 
countries with the smallest fraction of couples in which the female share of couple income is 
greater than 50%: women have more disposable income than their partner in only 13.2% of 
couples in Austria and only 11.6% in Luxembourg. In the Czech Republic, this figure is also 
relatively small (17.5%).  
The total equalizing function of the tax and social systems is apparent in Figure 1. The greater 
the distance from the 45 line, the higher the equalizing effect of the tax and benefit systems. 
The Czech Republic and the OMS are located lower along the 45 line than the NMS. 
 
Figure 1 Female share of couple gross and disposable income (%): All couples 
 
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation). 
 
Figari et al. (2007) provided similar analysis for nine old EU member states. They showed 
that the female share of couple gross income ranged from 18% in Greece, followed by 22% in 
Italy, up to 37% in Finland. The only three countries included both in their and the present 
study were Austria, Germany, and France. Although the values of female share of couple 
income stated by Figari et al. are somewhat lower than in the present study the relative results 
are similar. They found the strongest redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems in Austria, 
followed by Finland, the UK, and France while this effect in Germany was one of the lowest. 
The study of Figari et al. (2007) also included representatives from Southern European and 
Scandinavian countries. Southern European countries (Greece and Italy) exhibited the highest 
within-couple income inequality while Finland the lowest. However, the present study does 8 
 
not include any of Southern or Scandinavian countries. Instead, it compares the results in the 
NMS with a group of OMS that seem to belong rather to a ‘middle’ group in terms of within-
couple inequality.  
Regardless of whether we are considering gross, net, or disposable income, the female share 
of couple income is considerably higher in the NMS than in the OMS (see Table 1). The only 
exception is the Czech Republic, which exhibits values similar to the group of OMS. First of 
all, the female share of couple income is influenced by the economic activity of both partners. 
If we focus on two-earner couples only, the female share of couple income considerably 
increases in all countries, as is apparent in Table 1. So in the next section the analysis looks at 
the employment of women living in a couple, while Section 4.2 is devoted to two-earner 
couples. 
 
4.1 Female employment and the inter-generational transmission of the traditional family 
model 
The economic activity of the female partner determines within-couple income inequality to a 
substantial extent. Men are often the sole earners in the couples; this is least often the case in 
Slovakia (13% of couples) and most often in Luxembourg, where men are the only 
breadwinners in almost one-third of couples (see Table A.1). This traditional family 
behaviour was also very common in Luxembourg one generation earlier: 67% of male 
partners and 63% of female partners grew up in the traditional family, i.e., in a family where 
the father was the breadwinner and the mother was a housewife. My aim is to examine 
whether traditional family behaviour is transmitted between generations. 
I assume that in couples where the male and/or female partner grew up in a traditional family 
there is a greater probability that the female partner does not work, hence within-couple 
income inequality is much higher. In the majority of the countries analysed, the female shares 
of income are considerably lower when at least one partner grew up in a traditional family 
than if neither of the partners grew up in such a family, with the most apparent difference in 
Germany (see Table 1). The opposite is most apparent in Lithuania.  
 
4.1.1 Methodology 
I applied a logistic regression to demonstrate the impact that growing up in a traditional 
family has on the current employment of women living in a couple.
7 The dependent variable 
in the logistic regression takes the value 1 if the female partner worked the prevailing part of 
the year in 2004 and 0 otherwise. The logistic model is as follows: 
ln [p/(1-p)] = β0 + βiXi ,                                                                                                           (1) 
where  p is the probability that the female partner worked and vector Xi includes all the 
explanatory variables. The explanatory variables included in equation (1) are dummy 
variables that equal 1 if the male and the female partner grew up in a traditional family 
(M_TRADITION and F_TRADITION respectively) and 0 otherwise. The list of other control 
variables includes: female education, the educational gap between partners, the woman’s age, 
the age gap between partners, unearned income, the presence of children, marriage, and 
economically inactive male partner. 
                                                            
7 Logistic regression is commonly used for employment estimations (from recent studies, see, e.g., Holloway and 
Mulherin, 2004; McLaughlin and Coleman-Jensen 2008; Gornick et al., 2008). 9 
 
The education of the female partner is represented by dummies for medium and high 
education.
8 Given that education levels exhibit a positive influence on potential wages, 
education levels are expected to have an impact on the decision to work. Supposing that 
partners divide their ‘labour supply’, the partner with a higher education level should be the 
one who is supplying her/his labour since her/his potential wage is higher. Therefore, the 
relative education level of the male partner could also have an impact on the female partner’s 
work decision. Relative education is represented by dummies for a male education level 
higher and lower than his partner, measured in the number of years. 
The age of the female partner is represented by dummies for three age groups. Since age often 
serves as a proxy for work experience the reason for including the age gap between partners 
in the form of four dummies for age differences is similar to the justification for including the 
education gap. Moreover, Bonke (2006) suggests that the older the male partner is relative to 
his partner, the more he finds himself in a position as a breadwinner and if, on the contrary, 
the female partner is older than her partner, a dual-earner family/household is more likely.  
Unearned income includes various social benefits and allowances and other non-work 
income, e.g., rental income and inter-household transfers. This variable is represented by a 
dummy that takes the value 1 if a couple’s unearned income was greater than half of the at-
risk-of-poverty threshold in 2004 and 0 otherwise.
9 The presence of children is represented by 
three dummies for children aged 0 to 2, 3 to 5, and 6 to 15. Married couples are represented 
by a dummy variable. The last variable is determined by a dummy for an inactive male 




The results are stated in Table 2. Growing up in a traditional family proved to be insignificant 
for both male and female partners in almost half of the included countries. Among the new 
EU member states (NMS), growing up in the traditional family was significant only for the 
male partner in Hungary and the female partner in Slovakia. In Hungary, the odds ratio stands 
at 0.737, which means that female partners’ employment is approximately three-quarters as 
likely to occur among women whose partner grew up in the traditional family than among 
those whose partner did not. For women who grew up in a traditional family the odds ratio 
indicates a positive but insignificant impact on female partners’ employment (1.281).  
Slovak data confirmed a significant negative influence of women growing up in a traditional 
family (0.465), while the odds ratio for men growing up in a traditional family proved 
insignificant but still indicating a negative impact on current female employment. In the 
remaining NMS studied, the odds ratios of both males and females growing up in a traditional 
family exhibit an insignificant and negative impact on female employment, except among 
Lithuania and Estonian men. 
 
                                                            
8 High education (tertiary) – ISCED levels 5 and 6; medium education (upper secondary) – ISCED levels 3 and 
4; low education (‘basic’) – ISCED levels 0, 1 and 2. 
9 The “at-risk-of-poverty threshold” is defined as 60% of the national median of total disposable household 
income. I derived the at-risk-of-poverty threshold by taking into account all the households included in the EU-
SILC 2005 dataset. The absolute level of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold differs among countries. 10 
 
Table 2 Logistic regression: female work – odds ratio 
  AT BE CZ DE EE FR HU LT LU PL SK 
M_TRADITION  0.653***  1.145 0.699 0.824**  1.447 1.021 0.737*  1.314 0.866 0.928 0.705 
F_TRADITION  0.794 0.888 0.749 0.813**  0.622 0.768**  1.281 1.022 1.394**  0.879 0.465*** 
F_MEDIUM_EDUC  1.899*** 2.362*** 1.664  1.754*** 2.884*** 2.271*** 3.018*** 2.041**  1.310*  1.966*** 1.687 
F_HIGH_EDUC  2.193*** 5.562*** 2.922**  3.173*** 7.488*** 3.339*** 5.526*** 7.252*** 2.011*** 8.901*** 2.270 
M_HIGHER_ED  0.913 0.915 0.980 0.855 1.186 0.880 1.073 1.144 0.805 0.957 0.988 
M_LOWER_ED  1.543**  1.265 1.101 0.988 0.783 1.043 0.941 1.131 1.194 1.384***  1.592 
F_AGE25_34  2.137**  5.572*** 1.428  2.086*** 0.684  1.724**  1.600  3.271*** 8.400*** 0.953  0.685 
F_AGE35_44  2.815*** 4.265*** 2.072*  2.402*** 1.083  1.893*** 2.158*  4.904*** 5.303*** 1.577  1.068 
F_AGE45_54  1.833*  2.541***  1.011 2.060***  1.343 1.724**  1.762 1.526 2.746***  1.269 1.042 
M_OLDER10_  0.667 0.286***  0.639 0.833 2.552 0.919 1.858*  0.587 0.699 0.827 0.439* 
M_OLDER5_9  0.750 0.713 0.788 0.871 1.101 0.840 1.025 1.068 0.899 0.883 0.750 
F_OLDER1_5  0.944 0.921 1.286 0.836 0.742 0.857 0.871 1.587*  2.448***  0.742**  0.744 
F_OLDER6_  0.610 0.460 2.328 0.756 0.944 0.987 0.542 1.025 1.573 0.305***  0.365 
UNEARN_INC  0.374*** 0.309*** 0.118*** 0.309*** 0.249*** 0.231*** 0.109*** 0.514*** 0.641*** 0.291*** 0.112*** 
CHILD0_2  0.131*** 0.737  0.276*** 0.228*** 0.294*** 0.539*** 0.065*** 0.349*** 0.676**  0.518*** 1.530 
CHILD3_5  0.437*** 0.773  0.234*** 0.515*** 0.689  0.540*** 0.339*** 0.390*** 0.447*** 0.626*** 0.353*** 
CHILD6_15  0.754*  1.340 0.487***  0.636***  0.909 1.240*  1.046 0.672**  0.740**  0.839*  0.961 
MARRIAGE  0.619*  0.354*** 0.714  0.565*** 1.091  0.753**  1.069  4.134*** 0.272*** 1.126  1.128 
M_NOTWORK  8.603*** 7.549*** 15.249***  2.328*** 1.124  3.799*** 3.678*** 1.451  3.684*** 4.341*** 6.647*** 
CONSTANT  3.794*** 1.565  10.976***  2.576*** 2.382  3.224*** 2.800**  0.227*** 1.200  1.135  10.314** 
Correctness of observation 
classification 
78.1 81.9 83.8 72.0 82.5 79.6 84.7 81.3 67.4 74.9 85.0 
Notes: * significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level, *** significance at the 1% level. 
The economic activity was derived according to number of months when the main activity of respondent was full-time or part-time work. Even if number of worked months 
was zero, the earnings can be positive (irregular work or the individual worked lesser part of month). High education (tertiary) – ISCED levels 5 and 6; medium education 
(upper secondary) – ISCED levels 3 and 4; low education (‘basic’) – ISCED levels 0, 1 and 2. 
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation). 11 
 
Among the OMS, growing up in a traditional family proved to be significant for both men and 
women in Germany and either for men or for women in Austria, France, and Luxembourg, 
while it was insignificant for both in Belgium. German women who grew up in a traditional 
family or whose partner did are less likely to work (significant odds ratios 0.824 and 0.813, 
respectively).  In Luxembourg, the probability that a woman in a couple worked was 
significantly increased by her having grown up in a traditional family, and this was the only 
case among the countries studied of the women’s or men’s traditional background having a 
significant positive impact  (see Table 2).
10 
The results indicate that there tends to be a difference between the old and new EU member 
states – the inter-generational transmission of the traditional model of family is more apparent 
among the OMS than among the NMS. This confirms my supposition, since the couples in the 
post-communist new EU member states were raised in an environment of almost full 
employment. Therefore, the traditional model would not have been transmitted to a similar 
extent as in the OMS. However, there are some exceptions: Hungary and Poland are countries 
where in about one-third of couples at least one partner grew up in a traditional family, 
followed by Slovakia where this share was 26% (see Table A.1). Indeed, Hungary and 
Slovakia are the only NMS where the male’s or the female’s traditional family background 
proved to have a significant effect. Conversely, no significant effect on current female 
employment was observed in Poland. 
 
4.2 Income inequality in dual-income couples 
The gender difference in labour market participation is not the only reason for income 
inequality within couples. Theoretical and empirical evidence of the gender wage gap 
indicates that even two-earner couples experience substantial income inequality. Therefore, in 
this subsection, income inequality in dual-earner couples is described. 
 
Table 3 Female share of couple income – two-earner couples (%) 
Data source  AT  BE  CZ*  DE*  EE  FR  HU  LT  LU  PL  SK* 
LIS   1988  1989  1989      1986  
1986–1989   39.8  32.0  40.4      40.8  
   (12.4)  (17.8)  (12.4)      (10.7)  
LIS   1992  1992      1991  1991  1992  1992 
1991-1992   39.8  39.6      39.2  31.8  43.3  40.8 
   (11.9)  (11.8)      (16.8)  (16.1)  (11.2)  (12.5) 
LIS  1994  1995  1996  1994  1994  1994  1994  1995  
1994–1996  37.2 38.5 39.3 35.8    39.8 42.4    36.3 42.5   
  (16.2)  (14.0)  (13.5)  (19.9)  (17.8)  (16.9)  (15.2)  (12.1)  
LIS  1997  1997      2000  1999  1997    
1997–2000  37.5  41.2      39.0  42.4  32.2    
  (15.6)  (13.4)      (16.6)  (18.0)  (18.4)    
EU-SILC  2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 
2005  36.8 41.4 39.1 34.2 39.9 41.2  43.5*  43.1 35.4 44.6 41.2 
  (15.3) (12.4) (14.5) (20.1) (17.0) (16.6) (18.3) (18.5) (16.1) (18.1) (13.9) 
Notes: Means, standard deviations in parenthesis.   *Gross wages; all other figures are based on net wages. 
Source: 1986 – 2000: LIS database (author’s computation), 2004: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 
2009 (author’s computation). 
                                                            
10 The impacts of the control variables did not show surprising results and are apparent in Table 2. 12 
 
Table 3 shows the development of the female share of couple earnings in the countries under 
observation. Since most of the datasets did not provide information on income from self-
employment, only couples made up of two employees are considered. The female share of 
couple income exhibited relatively high values in Poland (43.3%) and Slovakia (40.8%) in the 
early 1990s and reached 42.4% in 1994 in Hungary. The 2004 values are even higher and, 
together with Lithuania, these NMS form a group of countries with relatively low within-
couple income inequality. Compared to that the Czech Republic experienced higher within-
couple income inequality and the female share of couple income decreased slightly over the 
1990s. 
 
Table 4 Female share of couple gross income (%) – Two-earner couples 
  AT BE CZ DE EE FR HU LT LU PL SK 
Gross earnings  36.2 39.8 38.1 36.6 40.7 40.3 44.9 41.9 35.1 42.9 44.4 
  (17.5) (14.2) (17.3) (21.5) (19.1) (18.2) (18.1) (22.5) (17.5) (24.2) (20.9) 
Couples in which women have greater gross earnings (% of two-earner couple sub-sample) 
  16.8 22.7 19.5 23.9 25.4 26.5 35.2 32.9 17.0 34.9 26.9 
Man has higher 
education 
31.7* 35.0* 34.3* 32.9*  36.8  34.2* 38.4* 32.4*  32.2  36.6* 39.1* 
(15.7) (16.0) (16.3) (20.5) (17.8) (19.5) (16.2) (21.7) (16.7) (23.8) (21.3) 
Same level of 
education 
35.4 39.5 38.1 36.3 39.7 40.3 45.2 39.8 34.4 41.5 44.6 
(16.7) (13.2) (16.9) (21.3) (18.8) (17.4) (17.9) (21.9) (17.8) (24.0) (20.4) 
Woman has 
higher educ.  
44.1* 42.9* 43.4* 41.6* 43.6* 43.8* 50.8* 49.7* 39.6* 49.0* 49.5* 
(19.0) (14.6) (19.9) (22.3) (19.7) (17.9) (18.9) (21.6) (16.8) (23.9) (22.6) 
Older partner 
aged under 45 
34.8* 40.9* 35.8* 35.6* 39.1*  40.6 43.9*  40.3* 34.8  43.4 43.3* 
(16.4) (13.9) (17.4) (21.3) (18.5) (18.0) (18.0) (22.5) (17.3) (23.7) (20.6) 
Older partner 
aged 45+ 
38.5 36.7 41.9 38.3 43.3 39.7 46.4 45.3 35.6 41.7 46.8 
(19.0) (14.6) (16.3) (21.8) (19.9) (18.5) (18.2) (22.2) (18.1) (25.4) (21.2) 
With dependent 
children 
34.1* 39.3 36.3*  32.4*  39.7*  39.7* 44.9 40.7*  33.6* 42.6  44.4 
(17.1) (14.6) (17.9) (21.7) (19.0) (18.2) (18.2) (22.8) (17.9) (24.3) (21.1) 
Without dep. 
children  
39.8 41.0 41.8 42.7 43.3 42.1 44.8 46.5 38.3 44.0 44.9 
(17.5) (13.0) (15.4) (19.8) (19.2) (18.0) (17.9) (20.8) (16.3) (24.1) (19.4) 
Married  couple  36.0 39.1*  37.4*  34.9* 40.6 38.8* 45.3  41.9 34.3* 42.7  44.4 
  (17.6) (14.6) (17.3) (21.5) (19.1) (18.1) (17.9) (22.5) (17.2) (24.2) (20.8) 
Not  married  37.6 43.0 43.5 45.5 40.8 44.3 42.5 41.4 38.9 47.2 46.4 
    (16.4) (11.6) (16.0) (19.5) (19.2) (17.8) (19.0) (22.5) (18.5) (23.5) (21.8) 
Net earnings  37.2 40.4 38.3 36.2 41.2 40.6  -  41.8 35.1 43.2  - 
  (16.5) (13.8) (16.9) (22.1) (18.8) (18.3)    (21.6) (17.3) (24.5)   
Couples in which women have greater net earnings (% of two-earner couple sub-sample) 
  16.0 21.0 19.2 23.8 23.8 27.2  -  32.7 15.3 35.3  - 
Disposable  inc.  38.5 41.2 39.8 36.5 41.7 41.3  -  42.6 36.7 43.3  - 
  (14.3) (12.3) (13.8) (18.4) (17.0) (15.3)    (20.0) (15.2) (23.0)   
Couples in which women have greater disposable income (% of two-earner couple sub-sample) 
  16.0 20.0 18.4 22.4 23.4 26.4  -  33.0 14.9 35.1  - 
Couples in which tax system increased female share of couple earnings (% of two-earner couple sub-sample) 
  67.0 59.0 60.7 46.9 67.6 61.8  -  49.5 50.3 50.4  - 
Increase  (pp.)**  2.4 3.2 0.8 3.7 1.3 0.9  -  2.4 2.1 1.7  - 
Couples in which benefit system increased female share of couple income (% of two-earner couple sub-sample) 
  56.0 57.8 45.4 48.7 54.3 45.3  -  25.3 58.4 21.7  - 
Increase  (pp.)**  3.3 1.9 4.9 3.8 2.1 3.9  -  4.5 3.4 4.0  - 
Couples in which tax-benefit system increased fem. share of couple income (% of two-earner couple sub-sample) 
  72.0 63.9 69.0 51.8 69.8 67.4  -  56.0 64.5 54.6  - 
Increase  (pp.)**  4.5 4.1 3.7 5.3 2.6 3.3  -  3.9 4.2 2.9  - 
Notes: Means, standard deviations in parenthesis. *Difference of means significant at 5% (t-test). For the level of 
education (measured in years) the mean is compared to the mean when having the same level of education. 
**Average percentage points increase of female share of couple income in couples where tax and/or benefit 
system induced a change. 
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation). 13 
 
The lowest value of the female share of couple income was recorded in Luxembourg in the 
early 1990s (31.8%) and this country together with Germany and Austria were the OMS with 
the highest within-couple income inequality also in 2004. Although there is no 
straightforward dividing line between the OMS and the NMS, there tends to be a slight 
difference between the two: the female share of couple income seems to be somewhat lower 
in the OMS, with a decreasing or fluctuating trend over time, while in the NMS the female 
share of couple income is relatively high and mostly increasing. The Czech Republic deviates 
from this latter trend, as the female share of couple income has been moderately decreasing 
over time and its 2004 value (like in Estonia) was lower than in the other NMS. 
Table 4 shows the female share of total gross income (earnings from both employment and 
self-employment) according to household characteristics as well as the effects of the tax and 
benefit systems in two-earner couples. Higher female education seems to be the substantial 
contributor to income equality. There is a significant difference between the average female 
shares of total gross income according to which partner achieved a higher level of education. 
In most NMS, near income equality in couples prevails if women have higher education, i.e. 
the female share of total gross income is approximately 50%. 
Figure 2 depicts the female share of couple gross and disposable income in two-earner 
couples. The Czech Republic together with the OMS are still situated lower along the 45 line 
than the other NMS. Moreover, the female share of gross income is still the lowest in 
Luxembourg, the equalizing effect of taxes is highest in Austria and Belgium, and the 
equalizing effect of the social system is highest in Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, and 
Austria. 
 
Figure 2 Female share of couple gross and disposable income (%): Two-earner couples 
 
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation). 
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Based on the results connected with the characteristics of all the couples in the sample 
(Table 1) and two-earner couples (Table 4), I can outline some general conclusions: (i) the 
Czech Republic appears to show features similar to the OMS rather than the NMS; (ii) the 
female share of couple gross income is lower in the Czech Republic and the OMS than in the 
NMS; (iii) the redistributive effect of the tax system is highest in Austria and Belgium; (iv) 
the redistributive effect of the social system is highest in the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, 
and Austria; and (v) the factors that contribute the most to within-couple income inequality 
are growing up in a traditional family, the male having a higher level of education, younger 
age, the presence of children, and marital status. 
A possible explanation of such difference between the Czech Republic and the other NMS 
might lie in the scheme of maternity/parental leave. The Czech system effective in 2004 
allowed women to stay at parental leave up to three years of child’s age with guaranteed 
return to their job. Such a length is rather exceptional among European countries, where the 
shortest parental leaves last several months (for more details, see, e.g., European Commission, 
2005b, 2009). Long interruption of work career has a negative impact on human capital, 
skills, and consequently on employability of women and their income.  
Nevertheless, long parental leave cannot deliver any explanation of different within-couple 
income in equality in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These countries underwent the same 
history as former Czechoslovakia, hence, traditions and family role attitudes are supposed to 
be similar in these countries. Moreover, the systems of maternity/parental leave have 
experienced only minor changes from the separation in 1993 till 2004 in both countries. 
However, there is one difference between the Czech Republic and Slovakia which might play 
a significant role in female labour market participation and within-couple income inequality – 
the use of childcare services. While, according to Kuchařová et al. (2009), only 3% of Czech 
children aged up to three years attended childcare institutions in 2004, this share was nearly 
18% in Slovakia in 2003. Higher availability and use of childcare services allows women to 
return back to work earlier which has a positive effect on sustaining their skills, work career 
and income. 
The exceptional results for the Czech Republic might not have been driven only by 
institutional settings such as maternity/parental leave, availability of childcare services or 
flexible work arrangements.
11 Other influential factors might be traditions, perceptions of 
family roles and attitudes to childcare. It seems that Czech women do not ‘hurry’ back to 
work. According to RILSA (2006), Czech women with one or more children returned back to 
work before the end of three-year parental leave rather rarely. Based on a research conducted 
in 2005, only 17% of mothers with one child returned to work before three years of age of the 
child, 18% right at the time when the child was three years old while 37% returned later and 
28% stayed at home or became unemployed. About 70% of mothers with more children 
stayed at home with second child straight away. 
 
                                                            
11 For instance, part-time employment of women was not extraordinary low in the Czech Republic. It reached 
8.3% in 2004, a value similar to all NMS, where it ranged from 4 to 13%. Share of women working part-time 
was much higher in included OMS (30 to 42%) in that time (European Commission, 2005a).  15 
 
5. The gender wage gap for cohabiting versus single individuals 
The analysis so far indicates the existence of substantial gender income inequality even within 
two-earner couples. Nevertheless, the preceding analysis only concerned annual earnings, thus 
ignoring the gender differences in work intensity. So this section focuses on hourly wages. 
Moreover, the previous results showed that even marriage seems to penalize women in terms 
of higher within-couple income inequality. There may even be greater gender income 
inequality among couples than among singles. The aim of this section is to find out whether 
and to what extent women living in a couple are disadvantaged compared to single females. 
Figure 3 shows the difference between the mean log hourly male and female wages separately 
for cohabitating (both married and not) and single individuals. 
The biggest gender wage gaps for both cohabiting and single sub-samples occurred in 
Estonia, followed by the Czech Republic. The gender wage gap is substantially higher for 
cohabiting individuals in all countries with the biggest difference in Germany and the smallest 
in Lithuania. Moreover, the average single women’s wages are even higher than single men’s 
wages in some countries. There are several possible sources of the differences in gender wage 
gaps for cohabiting and single individuals. First, male and female wages differ because men 
and women have different observable individual and job characteristics. Therefore, one reason 
for higher gender wage gaps for cohabiting individuals might be that cohabiting women have 
‘worse’ characteristics than single women. This might be related to the process of matching of 
couples itself or it might be due to the greater responsibilities cohabiting women have for 
family and/or children, which can cause the deterioration or lesser improvement of some 
characteristics of cohabitating women relative to single women. 
 
Figure 3 Gender log hourly wage gap (log points) 
 
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation). 
 
Second, single women might be treated more equally to men, while cohabiting women might 
be penalized with lower wages owing to their greater family responsibilities. However, this 
kind of possible discrimination is hard to measure since there are still other unobserved 
characteristics that can depict the differences not only between men and women but also 
between cohabiting and single individuals. 16 
 
5.1 Gender wage gap decomposition methodology  
Wage regression model estimates are used to provide a deeper insight into the structure of 
gender wage gaps. As a first step, this study applies the Heckman regression selection model 
in order to avoid the sample selection bias.
12 The estimated wage function under the selection-
corrected Heckman model is: 











                                                           (2) 
where vector Xi includes all explanatory variables of the wage equation,  and  signify 
standard normal density and distribution functions, respectively, Vi represents the vector of 
explanatory variables of the participation equation that should differ from that included in the 
wage equation, and  is the correlation coefficient of the wage and participation equations.
13 
The regression model estimating the influence of individual and job characteristics was run 
both separately for cohabiting and single individuals and for men and women. The Wald test 
of independent equations was used to prove if  is significantly different from zero and 
whether consequently there is a selection bias. In cases where the Wald test did not indicate 
the selection bias, standard OLS regression was applied (the second term on the right-hand 
side of equation (2) becomes zero).  
The dependent variable in the Heckman model is the logarithm of the hourly gross wage, 
which is not obtained directly, but is computed on the basis of the Eurostat definition of the 
gender wage gap.
14 The explanatory variables included in the male and female wage 
equations are years of education, years of experience and its square
15, two dummies for the 
size of a local unit where an individual works, a dummy for an unlimited job contract, a 
dummy for a managerial position, a dummy for living in densely populated cities,
16 and nine 
dummy variables for occupational groups. 
The explanatory variables included in the participation equations are total annual non-earned 
household income, a dummy for an inactive partner (only for the cohabiting sub-sample), 
three dummies for children of a particular age,
17 years of education, three dummy variables 
for age groups, and a dummy indicating a bad health condition.
18 
In the second step, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) is 
applied: 
                                                            
12 Sample selection bias occurs when working individuals do not create a random sub-sample of the population 
but differ systematically from non-participating individuals (Beblo et al., 2003). 
13 The Heckman model is a kind of two-stage regression where the propensity to participation in the labour 
market is estimated in the first step (including both employed and non-employed individuals) and then 
incorporated into the wage regression. For more details, see Heckman (1979) or some of the studies reproducing 
Heckman’s model (e.g. Beblo et al., 2003). 
14 The hourly gross wage is the usual monthly gross income from a person’s main job divided by the quadruple 
of the number of hours usually worked per week in the person’s main job, including common overtime. 
15 The Hungarian dataset lacks this variable, so a proxy ‘age minus six minus years in education’ was applied. 
16 A densely populated area is defined as a local unit with a density of more than 500 inhabitants per square 
kilometre and where the total population in the unit is at least 50,000 inhabitants. 
17 These household characteristics serve as the exclusion restriction that do not enter the wage equations, i.e. 
variables that affect participation in the labour market without affecting wages conditional on participating. 
18 To save space, the results of the regression models (four sets of results for each of the eleven countries) are not 
presented here, but they are available from the author upon request. 17 
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where expressions with a bar signify the mean values, M and F means male and female, 
respectively,  ˆ is the estimate of     and  ˆ is the average estimated i   from Heckman’s 
equation (2). The endowment effect is a component of the raw gender wage gap that is due to 
differences in individuals and job characteristics between the genders. Remuneration effect is 
a part that is due to the differences in the rewards that the two genders receive for their 
individual and job characteristics. If the Heckman model is applied, a selection effect arises. 
The selection effect reveals how the raw gender wage gap would change if non-participating 
individuals started working. If the Heckman correction procedure is not applied for men 
(women), the correction term for men (women) in equation (3), i.e.,  ˆM ( ˆF), is set to zero. 
 
5.2 Gender wage gap decomposition results  
The gender wage gap decomposition is presented in Table 5 and Figure 4. Table 5 shows the 
effects expressed in percentages of the difference between male and female log hourly wages 
(as shown in Figure 3). In the couples sub-sample, the endowment effect is mostly positive, 
which means that a certain part of the gender wage gap can be explain by men’s ‘better’ 
characteristics. Mostly positive endowment effects were found also by Nicodemo (2009), who 
analysed the gender wage gap using the 2006 data for married couples in five OMS 
countries.
19 The endowment effect in France was substantially lower in her study (less than 
20%, while it is 45% in the present study). However, this inconsistency might be caused by 
analysing all the cohabiting couples in the present study, while Nicodemo (2009) included 
married couples only. 
This effect is even negative in most of the NMS (CZ and HU being the exception), which 
suggests that cohabiting working females have, on average, ‘better’ characteristics than their 
male counterparts.  
 
Table 5 Gender wage gap decomposition (%) 
 AT  BE  CZ DE EE FR HU LT  LU  PL  SK
Couples        
endowment effect  36.2  39.7  16.8 28.5 -7.4 44.8 6.5 -63.6 52.2  -140.4 -4.0
remuneration effect  63.9  60.3  88.2 71.5 97.2 51.9 106.3 163.6  -41.2  240.3  104.0
selection effect  -  -  -4.9 - 10.1 3.3 -12.8 -  89.0  -  -
Singles          
endowment effect  -84.9  -323.0  -22.1 118.3 -39.4 119.0 146.2 -155.3  -59.9  93.7  -83.0
remuneration  effect  155.5 423.3 122.1 -22.2 139.4 -19.0 57.5 255.3 198.0  93.0 192.1
selection effect  29.5  -  - 4.0 - - -103.7 -  -38.1  -86.7  -9.1
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation). 
 
In the sub-sample of singles, the endowment effect is negative in all countries. Although 
Table 5 shows a positive percentage share of the gender wage gap in Germany, France, 
                                                            
19 France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece. 18 
 
Hungary, and Poland, note that single women’s wages are, on average, higher than single 
men’s in these four countries (see Figure 3). Figure 4 demonstrates the gender wage structure 
in log points, which depicts the negativity of the endowment effect more straightforwardly. 
 
Figure 4 Gender wage gap decomposition (log points) 
 
Notes: c – cohabiting individuals, s – singles. 
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation). 
 
Figure 5 shows the adjusted gender wage gap after subtracting the endowment effect, i.e. the 
part of the gap that is caused by different characteristics between genders. The gender wage 
gaps remain relatively high and positive (with the exception of Poland for the singles sub-
sample). The gender wage gap for singles is no more negative after this adjustment in 
Germany, France, and Hungary. The disparity between the adjusted gender wage gaps for the 
cohabiting and single sub-samples has narrowed compared to the raw (unadjusted) gender 
wages gaps in Figure 3. The reason is that the endowment effect for the singles sub-sample 
was negative in all countries while it was positive for the cohabiting sub-sample in the 
majority of the countries. If single women have on average ‘better’ characteristics than single 
men and the raw gender wage gap is still positive, then, as a consequence, the difference in 
rewards to these characteristics has to be higher than the observed raw gender wage gap.  
Nevertheless, the gender wage gap adjusted for different gender individual and job 
characteristics is still higher for the cohabiting than for the singles sub-sample. The gender 
differences in returns to characteristics might be a form of discrimination, apparently stronger 
against women living in a couple, or it could reflect some unobserved heterogeneity that the 
model does not capture. If there is discrimination it may be that employers disadvantage 
women living in a couple relatively more than single women because of their greater 
responsibilities for family and children or expectations that they will have greater family 
commitments in the near future. On the other hand, women living in a couple may differ from 
single women based on their choices in terms of their career, working effort, or other 19 
 
unobservable characteristics. However, this analysis does not provide any potential 
explanations and the remaining adjusted gender wage gap must be considered as unexplained. 
 
Figure 5 Gender log hourly wage gap – after subtracting endowment effect (log points) 
 
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation). 
 
6. Summary 
Recent empirical evidence stresses that households do not pool their income and do not have a 
unitary utility function. Quite the contrary, individual income brought into the household 
budget can influence the consumption, decision power, and/or social well-being of particular 
household members. This study analysed the within-couple income inequality in eleven 
European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, France, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, and Slovakia. 
The female share of couple gross earned income ranges from 25.6% in Luxembourg and 
28.5% in Austria to 41.3% in Slovakia and 40.9% in Lithuania. From this point view, the 
Czech Republic, with a relatively low female share of total gross couple income (32.6%), 
differs from the other new EU member states observed here and instead belongs to the group 
of old EU member states. Besides the economic activity of partners, factors that negatively 
influence within-couple income inequality are higher male relative education, younger age, 
children, and marriage. 
The redistributive effect of the tax system is highest in Austria and Belgium, while the 
redistributive effect of social system is highest in the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and 
Austria. This is partly caused by the share of couple gross income which is one of the lowest 
in these countries and, hence, the equalizing function of social benefits is stronger. 
Figari et al. (2007) provided similar analysis for nine old EU member states. They found the 
strongest redistributive effect of tax-benefit systems in Austria and one of the lowest in 
Germany. Southern European countries (Greece and Italy) exhibited the highest within-couple 
income inequality while Finland the lowest. The present study does not include any of the 
Southern or Scandinavian countries. Instead, it compares the results in the new EU members 
and the old EU members that seem to belong rather to a ‘middle’ group in terms of within-
couple inequality.  20 
 
The female share of total couple income is highly influenced by the employment of the female 
partner. In particular, this study examined whether the traditional model of the family is 
transmitted from the previous generation to the current one. The hypothesis that growing up in 
a traditional family, i.e. in a family in which the father was the breadwinner and the mother a 
housewife, can negatively influence the employment of current female partners was 
significantly confirmed in Germany, Austria (in the case of the male partner only), France, 
and Luxembourg (in the case of the female partner only), and among the new EU members in 
Hungary and Slovakia (in the case of the male partner only). In Belgium and the remaining 
four new EU member states, neither the male nor the female partner’s growing up in a 
traditional family proved to have a significant effect on current female employment.  
Within-couple income inequality among two-earner couples is the most significantly affected 
by the educational gap between partners. In some countries, there is near income equality 
among couples in which the woman’s level of education is higher. 
The final part of this study focused on the gender wage gap separately for individuals living in 
a couple and singles. The gender wage gap proved to be bigger for cohabiting individuals than 
for singles even after adjusting for gender differences in individual and job characteristics. 
This suggests that women living in a couple are either more disadvantaged in terms of their 
wages (and) or their unobserved characteristics substantially differ from those of single 
women. 
To my knowledge, this study provides the first insight into within-couple income inequality in 
some post-communist countries. It found that among the countries considered the Czech 
Republic more resembles the old EU member states than it does the other new member states 
in some of the examined income inequality aspects. Further research will hopefully focus on 
detecting the reasons for the differences between the Czech Republic and other new EU 
member states. I can only formulate a tentative hypothesis at this stage of research. A possible 
argument would be the extremely long parental leave in the Czech Republic which allowed 
women to stay at parental leave up to three years of child’s age with guaranteed return to their 
job. Long interruption of women’s work career has a negative impact on their human capital, 
skills, and consequently on employability of women and their income. Missing motives to 
return to job are accompanied by extremely low capacity of childcare services (only 3% of 
Czech children aged up to three years attended childcare institutions in 2004, Kuchařová et 
al., 2009). 
The reasons for the differences between the Czech Republic and other post-communist 
countries could be highly relevant for formulating economic and social policies aimed at 
mitigating income inequality within Czech couples and bringing the potentially lower social 
well-being of women closer to men’s.  21 
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Table A.1 Sample characteristics: Couples 
  AT BE CZ DE EE FR HU LT LU PL SK 
Sample size (unweighted)  1383 1288 1202 3747 1107  2729 1617 1268 1270 3593 1342 
% of all households  23.8 23.0 30.5 25.9 24.1  25.4 23.6 27.0 33.8 21.5 25.1 
% of all couples  37.5 40.3 45.7 46.9 45.7 41.1 39.3 45.8 51.1 30.5 34.9 
Sample characteristics (%)             
Woman worked 6+ months*  67.8 78.3 76.1 65.0 77.8  77.3 66.8 80.6 63.1 70.5 84.2 
Man worked 6+ months*  95.0 94.5 96.0 90.6 92.3  95.0 90.4 88.7 96.1 88.1 93.5 
Man only worked*  28.8 19.7 20.4 29.3 15.5  18.6 29.4 14.3 32.8 25.7 13.1 
Woman only worked*  3.9 4.8 3.4 5.9 4.8  2.9 6.9 8.4 3.2 8.5 4.8 
Both worked*  67.2 75.1 76.2 63.7 78.9  78.3 62.4 76.6 64.1 65.6 82.0 
Neither worked (whole year)*  0.1 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.9  0.1 1.3 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Man grew up in traditional model  57.5 60.5 9.5 48.8 5.2  55.4 22.0 10.1 67.1 20.8 16.6 
Woman grew up in trad. family  53.6 59.6 6.9 44.8 6.2  48.1 18.9 10.6 62.6 20.0 13.6 
At least one partner grew up in t.f.  76.8 81.4 14.4 65.8 10.4  74.2 33.4 19.0 82.9 32.6 26.0 
Neither grew up in trad. family  23.2 18.6 85.6 34.2 89.6 25.8 66.6 81.0 17.1 67.4 74.0 
Male – high education**  28.0 42.8 18.9 43.1 28.7  27.5 20.6 24.8 27.7 19.6 22.1 
Male – medium education**  63.5 39.5 77.2 52.7 63.7  48.8 66.2 68.2 43.5 73.2 75.5 
Male – low education**  8.5 17.8 3.9 4.2 7.6  23.7 13.1 7.0 28.7 7.2 2.4 
Female – high education**  21.1 48.4 16.1 34.3 41.9  34.6 22.6 33.6 29.0 26.3 20.6 
Female – medium education**  61.2 34.2 76.9 59.4 51.7  44.1 57.9 61.0 37.3 66.2 75.9 
Female – low education**  17.7 17.4 6.9 6.3 6.4  21.2 19.5 5.4 33.7 7.5 3.5 
Man has higher education***  30.1 18.8 14.6 28.9 16.0  18.7 19.4 15.3 24.6 10.5 12.7 
Same level of education***  51.8 55.6 75.4 50.3 48.7  54.1 65.6 54.2 56.6 68.5 77.4 
Woman has higher education***  18.1 25.6 10.0 20.8 35.3  27.2 15.1 30.6 18.8 21.0 10.0 
Older partner aged under 45  64.7 65.5 63.8 62.4 62.7  62.7 63.8 65.1 62.8 68.3 67.2 
Older partner aged 45+  35.3 34.5 36.2 37.6 37.3  37.3 36.2 34.9 37.2 31.7 32.8 
With dependent children  68.5 67.4 71.0 63.4 74.4  73.5 74.9 77.1 72.4 81.0 85.9 
Without dependent children  31.5 32.6 29.0 36.6 25.6  26.5 25.1 22.9 27.6 19.0 14.1 
Not married  10.8 13.6 9.6 13.5 26.6  26.2 16.3 5.1 13.2 4.9 3.6 
Married couple  89.2 86.4 90.4 86.5 73.4 73.8 83.7 94.9 86.8 95.1 96.4 
Notes: *The economic activity was derived according to number of months when the main activity of respondent was full-time or part-time work. Even if number of worked 
months was zero, the earnings can be positive (irregular work or the individual worked lesser part of month). **High education (tertiary) – ISCED levels 5 and 6; medium 
education (upper secondary) – ISCED levels 3 and 4; low education (‘basic’) – ISCED levels 0, 1 and 2. ***Education was measured in number of years need for highest 
educational level attained. 
Source: EU-SILC UDB 2005 – version 5 of August 2009 (author’s computation).  
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